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Mexico's Expanding Matrix of Trade
Agreements - A Unifying Force?*
Sergio L6pez-Ayll6n**
I. Introduction.
Latin America is a different place from what it was ten years ago. I think that this
point, which might seem trite, should not be underestimated. It is only by understanding
the scope of transformations that one can understand the processes of regional integration
currently being experienced by the American continent, and NAFTA's role in this. It is
worth noting that these processes are not one-dimensional. In fact, they constitute the axis
around which a set of frequently contradictory economic and political forces revolve.
NAFTA is a paradigmatic example of this complex web of interests and, as I shall argue
below, sets a unique precedent whose ultimate consequences are still difficult to assess
because of their intrinsic complexity.
Indeed, in the decades following the Second World War, the majority of Latin
American countries adopted the import substitution model. This model was based on the
development of a closed economy, 1 with a correspondingly closed legal system. Changes in
both the rest of the world and in the regional economic environment, and the limits of the
model itself (such as foreign debt, high inflation rates, public deficit, companies' lack of
international competitiveness, and the shortage of investment flows), forced most Latin
American countries to change direction in the 1980s. At the beginning of this period, eco-
nomic development policies and strategies were modified-albeit with significant variations
in each country-to make way for the liberalization of the economy, sale of public firms,
deregulation, and the opening of trade. 2
As a result of the change in the economic model and the need for more open trade,
Latin American countries gradually began to become integrated into the international eco-
* Suzanne Stephens prepared the English version of this article.
** Research Fellow, Institute of Legal Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico.
1. During the period, CEPAL's conceptions played a significant role. According to the economist
Rail Prebisch, it was "necessary to strengthen the industrial sector with protection mechanisms
while a reinforced production structure was created to compete at the Latin American level, in
markets that would be opened as a result of the integration and subsequently in international
markets,' quoted in Gustavo Vega CAnovas, Mexico en las nuevas tendencias de la economfa y el
comercio internacionales, 28 FORO INTERNACIONAL 66 (1987).
2. See MARCOS KAPLAN, EL ESTADo LATINOAMERICANA (M6xico, U.N.A.M. 1996); Werner Baer &
Melissa Birch, Privatization and the Changing Role of the State in Latin America, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 1 (1992). For the case of Mexico see Pedro Aspe, El camino mexicano de la transforma-
ci6n econ6mica, Mexico, FCE, 1993. It is worth noting that this process happens in other parts of
the world. See, e.g., MERILEE S. GRINDLE, CHALLENGING THE STATE. CRISIS AND INNOVATION IN LATIN
AMERICA AND AFRICA (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
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nomic and trade system, while at the same time competing to attract foreign capital flows.
At present, all the countries in the continent are members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) 3 and participate in the various agreements and organizations of
multilateral economic cooperation. 4 At the same time, regional integration stopped being
purely rhetorical and was instead expressed in several agreements that have been estab-
lished or revitalized in recent years. 5 The most ambitious initiative is undoubtedly that
seeking to create a large area of continental free trade, the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), negotiation of which is expected to be completed in 2005 (see infra section III).
Throughout this process, the negotiation and passage of NAFTA constituted a point
of inflection that, for various reasons, modified the horizon of the regional integration
agreements. Without attempting to provide an exhaustive account, Section II points out
the features of NAFTA that make it a unique agreement, while Section III analyzes its role
in the future of the economic and trade integration of the Americas. NAFTA is unlikely to
serve as an axis around which the process of trade integration in the American continent
will revolve. The Agreements signed by Mexico under the NAFTA model, however, will
undoubtedly mark this process and constitute an inevitable point of reference, regardless
of the future of regional integration.
II. NAFTA as a Unique Regional Integration Agreement.
NAFTA is, for a number of reasons, an agreement with specific political and technical
characteristics. From a political point of view, NAFTA was the first free trade agreement
between two of the most developed economies in the world, Canada and the United States,
and a less developed country, Mexico. This was possible due to unusual political condi-
tions, and implied a significant change in the way each of the three countries understood
its role in trade and geopolitical relations in the region and the world. The changes had
profound implications for the integration of the Americas.
For the United States, first CUSFTA and then NAFTA constituted a reversal of the
trade policy towards the regional approach, at least as a complement to "its previous exclu-
sive support of the multilateral approach. '6 Canada tried to avoid the creation of a "hub
and spoke" system (with the United States being the hub) by adopting a far more aggres-
sive trade policy towards Latin America.7 Finally, for Mexico, NAFTA represented a radical
3. See World Trade Organization <http://www.wto.org>.
4. See BERNARD COLAS, GLOBAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION. A GUIDE TO AGREEMENTS AND
ORGANIZATIONS 510-38 (2d ed., Deventer Boston, Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers-United
Nations Univ. Press 1994).
5. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration in the Americas: A Work in
Progress, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 493 (1994); Roberto Pizarro, Renovaci6n y dinamismo de la inte-
graci6n latinoamericana en los aios noventa 28 Estudios internacionales 198 (1995); ALADI, LA
NUEVA REALIDAD DE LA INTEGRACION, Montevideo, Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Integraci6n, 1997.
6. Serge Devos, The Multilateral Rules and the New Dimension of Regional Integration: Weaknesses,
Need and Scope for More Disciplines, in REGIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM AFTER THE URUGUAY
ROUND. CONVERGENCES, DIVERGENCES AND INTERACTION 728 (Paul Demaret, Jean Franqois Bellis &
Gonzalo Garcia Jim~nez eds., Brussels, European Inter-univ. Press 1997).
7. See Louis Perret, Elfuturo del libre comercio en el continente americano; la politica canadiense, in
EL FUTURO DEL LIBRE COMERCIO EN EL CONTINENTE AMERICANO. ANALISIS Y PERSPECTIVAS 176-77
(Sergio L6pez-Ayll6n ed., Mexico, U.N.A.M. 1997).
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change of direction in its relation with the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada.8
From the time it was originally proposed, the agreement was conceived as one that
would have universal coverage. Moreover, although the asymmetry between the economies
was acknowledged, Mexico was not given special, different treatment per se, nor were there
fiscal transfers in the form of financial aid funds for development. In this respect, NAFTA
signified a new type of relation between economies with different levels of development.
As one observer has pointed out:
"the NAFTA approach, of a conventional free trade area supplemented by
investment, services and carefully delimited temporary entry provisions
(instead of full labor mobility), could prove more flexible in facilitating
regional economic integration when countries have different income levels." 9
It should be noted that the cost Mexico had to pay to prepare for and adapt to the new
circumstances, including the negotiation and implementation of NAFTA, was extremely
significant. Without going into details, between 1982 and 1995, most of Mexico's internal
legal system was modified, particularly as regards economic, trade, and financial issues.
Thus, 164 of the 204 federal statutes (except for Federal District legislation) in force in
1995 were new or substantially modified. In other words, Mexico had to modify nearly
eighty percent of its domestic legal system as a result of the new orientation of the eco-
nomic growth model and trade liberalization. 10
Technically speaking, a free trade agreement typically involves the elimination of tar-
iffs and other restrictive regulations of commerce between two or more customs territo-
ries. I I NAFTA went well beyond this. Indeed, based primarily on CUSFTA and part of the
Dunkel text, NAFTA negotiations produced an agreement of outstanding coverage and
technical complexity. Let us examine the reasons for this.
First, with few exceptions, 12 NAFTA includes all goods, including agricultural goods 13
and services. Second, NAFTA contains a set of extensive, detailed internal disciplines
8. See Maria Teresa Gutierrez-Haces, L' tat mexicain et les 1tats-Unis: du protectionnisme au libre
commerce, in LE MEXIQUE A L'AUBE DU TROISIME MILLENAIRE 79-104 (Marie France Pr6v6t & jean
Revel-Mouroz eds., Paris, Institut des hautes 6tudes de l'Am~rique latine 1993); M6nica Serrano,
Reflexiones en torno a la iniciativa de una zona norteamericana de libre comercio, in Mexico frente
al umbral del siglo XXI 123-43 (Manuel Alcdntara & Antonia Martinez eds., Madrid, Centro de
Investigaciones Sociol6gicas-Siglo XXI 1992).
9. Murray Smith, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Global Impacts, in REGIONAL
INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 85 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds.,
New York-London-Toronto, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993).
10. See Sergio L6pez-Ayll6n, LAS TRANSFORMACIONES DEL SISTEMA JURIDICO Y LOS SIGNIFICADOS SOCIALES
DEL DERECHO EN MxiYCO 172-223 (Mexico, U.N.A.M. 1996).
11. Experience shows that most of these agreements do not include all goods and services. See
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 5 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst
eds., New York-London-Toronto, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993).
12. The main exceptions are the following: the energy sector for Mexico (annex 602.3), maritime
cabotage and exports controls on logs for the U.S. (Annex 301.3) and cultural industries for
Canada (annex 2106). North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
13. Exceptions to this rule include dairy, poultry, and egg products excluded from the Mexico-
Canada agricultural bilateral agreement.
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regarding internal procedures. These include customs, 14 safeguards,' 5 technical
standards, 16 government procurement, 17 antidumping/countervaiing duty,18 and intellec-
tual property19 procedures. It also includes special provisions concerning transparency and
administrative and legal procedures.20
Third-a rarely analyzed issue-NAFTA integrates an investment agreement into a con-
ventional trade agreement for the first time. Strictly speaking, NAFTA is both a trade and
an investment agreement combined in a single instrument. This characteristic has impor-
tant consequences in regards to certain goods (e.g. automotive goods), but primarily in
regards to services, since commercial presence, the principal form of services trade, implies
investment. NAFTA arguably is "the most comprehensive package of services trade and
investment liberalization achieved in an intergovernmental trade agreement to date."21
The legal consequences of the inclusion of an investment chapter into NAFTA were evi-
dent from the time of drafting the agreement. 22 In addition to the above, NAFTA also inte-
grated specific disciplines concerning intellectual property.
Fourth, most of the rules of origin in NAFTA respond to the criterion of changes in
tariff headings. 23 Nevertheless, NAFTA also contains a set of complex and controversial
rules of origin applicable to certain sectors, particularly the automotive and textile sectors,
which in turn respond to the interests of national industries and the economic characteris-
tics of the region. 24
From an institutional point of view, the Free Trade Commission, comprised of trade min-
istries, is a consultative and monitoring body, although its decisions must be adopted by the
Parties through its internal procedures. The agreement contains three dispute settlement mech-
anisms25 to ensure the fulfillment of obligations in the agreement. Compliance with the deci-
sions of the dispute settlement panels is subject to certain rules and protection. NAFTA, howev-
er, did not create bodies of a supranational nature whose decisions directly involve the parties.
14. See NAFTA, supra note 12, ch.V.
15. See id. art. 803 & annex 803.3.
16. See id. chs. IX &VI, sec. B.
17. See id. ch. X, secs. B & C.
18. See id. art. 1904.15 & annex 1904.15.
19. See id. arts. 1714-1718.
20. See id. arts. 718,909, 1019, 1306, 1411, 1604 & ch. XVIII.
21. See Pierre Sauv6, Regional versus Multilateral Approaches to Services and Investment Liberalization:
Anything to Worry About?, in REGIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND.
CONVERGENCES, DIVERGENCES AND INTERACTION, supra note 6, at 442.
22. See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1112.1, which states: "In the event of any inconsistency between
this Chapter (Investment) and another Chapter, the other Chapter shall prevail to the extent of
the inconsistency."
23. During the NAFTA negotiations, considerable efforts were made to ensure clear and transparent
rules of origin.
24. See David Palmeter, Rules of Origin in Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas, in REGIONAL
INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 330-3 1; Smith, supra note 9,
at 89-94.
25. See Gary Horlick & Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Building on the U.S.-
Canada FTA, GATT and ICSID, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 51 (1993); Andrew Kayami Rosa, Old Wine, New
Skins: NAFTA and the Evolution of International Trade Dispute Resolution, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 255
(1993); an assessment in David L6pez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early
Experiences, 32 TEX. INT'L L. I. 163 (1977).
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Finally, NAFTA and its side agreements include certain aspects of environmental,
labor, and competition issues, albeit in a limited and incomplete fashion. In the future,
trade negotiations will include these issues, and while insufficient, their resolutions will
serve as a useful point of reference.
Beyond these technical aspects, the negotiation of NAFTA constituted an encounter
between two distinct legal traditions in an unusually intense interaction. Indeed, while a
common language-economics-permitted the communication of economic interests, the
same could not be said of law. The drafting, but above all, the implementation of the
Agreement, entailed contact between the common and civil law systems, whose structure,
concepts, and practice are different. The effect of the contact between these systems per-
meates the whole text of the agreement and achieves a compromise in several of its institu-
tions. The effect is even more dramatic in view of the fact that, due to the way the recep-
tion of agreements operates in the Mexican legal system, these institutions are directly
incorporated into Mexican law.26
This encounter between legal systems and cultures is one of the reasons behind the
scope and detail of the agreement. Added to the normal distrust concerning the operation
and fulfillment of an agreement between parties was the accuracy and fondness for detail
of Anglo-Saxon legal culture, as opposed to the more general, principle-based style of writ-
ing of Latin culture. The result was a text of over 2000 pages, contrasting sharply with
other regional integration agreements that are far less lengthy.
The overall detail of NAFTA contrasts sharply with its accession clause, which, technical-
ly open to any other country in the world, contains just a few lines. Let us examine the scope
of the latter from the perspective of its possible expansion to the south of the continent.
III. NAFTA and the Future of Trade Integration in
the American Continent.
The role played by Mexico and NAFTA in the development of regional integration in
the American continent can only be understood within a broader process 27 that is taking
place simultaneously at various levels. The first and most general of these corresponds to
the multilateral trade system. The second concerns the complex network of regional inte-
gration agreements signed in recent years in the American continent. Finally, the third, as
yet only on the horizon, is the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas, FTAA,
scheduled for 2005. This article examines each of these levels below.
26. See Hctor Fix-Fierro & Sergio L6pez-Ayll6n, Comunicaci6n entre culturas jurdicas: los paneles
binacionales del Capitulo XIX del TLCAN, in 8 REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 19 (1997) (English
version to be published as Communication Between Legal Cultures: The Case of NAFTA's Chapter
19 Binational Panels, in THE EVOLUTION OF FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS (Louis Perret ed., col.
Doing Business Abroad 10, Montreal, Wilson and Lafleur (in press))).
27. For an overview, see CEPAL (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean),
PANORAMA DE LA INSERCION INTERNACIONAL DE AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE, Santiago, Comisi6n
Econ6mica para America Latina y el Caribe, 1996.
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A. THE MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM.
All of the countries in the American continent are currently members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Consequently, regional trade agreements must be analyzed
within the framework of the WTO rules from at least two points of view. The first is
linked to the consistency of these agreements with multilateral rules; the second is linked
to their scope.
Generally, Article 101 of NAFTA declares its consistency with article XXIV of GATT,
and in Article 103 the Parties affirm their rights and obligations under the GATT.28
NAFTA is, in effect, a free trade agreement, 29 signed according to article XXIV 30 of the
GATT.31 Under this article, the three NAFTA Parties notified the GATT that they had
signed the agreement, which was subsequently examined by a working party. As in the
great majority of cases, 32 this examination did not result in the express recognition of
NAFTA's consistency with article XXIV, nor did it suggest that it did not comply with these
requirements, leaving a legally ambiguous situation that it shares with most of the integra-
tion agreements currently in force. A WTO report notes that:
Some of the contracting parties have interpreted the lack of recommenda-
tions on the subject as meaning that the agreement in question is consistent
with article XXIV, while others have interpreted it as meaning that, in view of
the lack of a final decision on the contracting parties working collectively on
the consistency of a particular agreement with the provisions of Article XXIV,
the legal condition of the agreement has not yet been established. 33
28. The same article established as a general rule that, in the event of any inconsistency between
NAFTA and the GATT, NAFTA shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.
29. Theorists of economic integration typically rank the regional integration agreements as follows:
preferential trade agreements, or areas (PTAs, in which signatories impose lower tariffs on each
other's imports than on imports from third countries); free trade areas, or agreements (FTAs,
involving not just lower but zero tariffs between member states, although typically not on all
goods and services); customs unions (CUS, which are FTAs, but with the same external trade mea-
sures for all member states); common markets (CMs, which allow free movement of factors as
well as products between member states); and economic unions (EU, involving not only common
factors markets and trade policies but also harmonization of other micro and macroeconomic
policies). See REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 4-5.
30. GATT Article XXIV is an exception to the most-favored-nation provision of Article I of the
GATT. It allows the establishment of free trade areas and customs unions. See Richard Snape,
History and Economics of GATT's Article XXIV, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL
TRADING SYSTEM, supra note I I, at 273-9 1.
31. See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 101. It should be recalled that the agreement was signed in
December 1992, a year before negotiations for the GATT Uruguay Round were completed.
32. According to WTO data, by late 1997, notification of 144 regional integration agreements had
been given. Until January 1995, the Working Parties had only expressly acknowledged the con-
sistency of these agreements with Article XXIV in six cases. In the remaining cases, the reports
had confined themselves to pointing out the divergent opinions of participating members
regarding consistency with the agreement in question. See Organizaci6n Mundial del
Comercio, El regionalismo y el sistema mundial de comercio, Geneva, Organizaci6n Mundial
del Comercio, 1995, at 20-21.
33. Id. at 21.
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In practice, since NAFTA's consistency with the multilateral system has not been chal-
lenged by any country during a dispute settlement procedure, the agreement can be said to
comply with the requirements of Article XXIV and is a viable model under the multilateral
system. The agreement's scope, however, warrants particular analysis.
Indeed, it has already been said that NAFTA, concluded before the end of the Uruguay
Round, has universal coverage that includes goods, services, investment, intellectual prop-
erty, and various dispute settlement mechanisms. The GATT, under whose coverage the
agreement was negotiated, was restricted to trade in goods. It was not until the creation of
the WTO that the multilateral system coverage included trade in services and certain
aspects linked to intellectual property. In other words, multilateral rules concerning these
issues were in force only after NAFTA came into effect. Consequently, NAFTA's consistency
with some multilateral rules (particularly in relation to Article V of the GATS) was not
examined within the WTO. Consequently, certain issues within NAFTA will only be able to
be examined in light of multilateral rules through an examination by the WTO of other
agreements that, following the NAFTA model, have been negotiated since 1995.
The WTO's expanded coverage has other important consequences since it establishes
a "minimum common denominator" for rules and disciplines applicable to all the organi-
zation's member countries. This means that regional integration agreements subsequent
to the Uruguay round are only meaningful if they contain rules that enhance liberaliza-
tion or include sectors that have so far been insufficiently or barely developed within the
WTO framework. In other words, NAFTA's viability as a model for regional integration
depends on its having a more liberalizing effect than that offered by the rules of the mul-
tilateral system.34
It is not possible to offer a detailed comparative examination of the aspects in which
NAFTA offers more liberal rules and disciplines than the WTO in this paper.35 We shall
merely point out certain general aspects that we think will suffice to illustrate our argu-
ment in the sense that NAFTA is a model, which, although perfectible, is better and goes
further towards liberalization than the rules of the multilateral system, while at the same
time being consistent with the latter.
* NAFTA offers a quicker and fuller period of tariff elimination than that proposed
at the multilateral level.36
* NAFTA permits broader and fuller liberalization coverage in the service sector.37 In
particular, it has more developed liberalization schemes than at the multilateral
34. It is worth remembering that, as we mentioned earlier (see supra sec. III), one of the sources of
NAFTA was the Dunkel text. In this respect, NAFTA includes most of the disciplines included in
the Uruguay Round Agreements.
35. Obviously, due to the characteristics of regional integration agreements, the latter will have rules
that are not necessary in a multilateral context. Such is the case, for example, of rules of origin or
bilateral safeguards.
36. We have already mentioned that, with a few limited exceptions, NAFTA includes universal cover-
age as regards goods trade. See supra sec. II. It also includes special rules for textiles, automobiles,
agricultural products and certain energy goods.
37. Both national treatment and most-favored-nation principles are adopted regarding trade in ser-
vices. The Agreement also provides that no local presence is required to provide covered services.
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level in professional services, 38 land transport,39 telecommunications, 40 and finan-
cial services. 4
1
NAFTA includes aspects linked to investment,42 including a dispute settlement
mechanism for investor-State issues. This permits a better and more efficient scheme
for the liberalization of services 43 and investment-related aspects of trade.44
* NAFTA includes specific liberalization rules for government purchases. 45
* NAFTA has more advanced disciplines in the area of technical standards. 46
* NAFTA permits the inclusion of dispute settlement mechanisms in antidump-
ing/countervailing duty matters. 47
38. With respect to licensing and certification of professionals, the Agreement provides that entry require-
ments should be related solely to competence and endorses a qualified mutual recognition principle.
39. In the case of land transportation services, the Agreement provides for cross-border provision of
bus and trucking services to be phased in over a transitional period. This provision, however, has
not been implemented between the United States and Mexico. Mexico has initiated a dispute set-
tlement procedure in this matter.
40. See NAFTA, supra note 12, ch. 13.
41. The Agreement recognizes the right of establishment with respect to banking, insurance, securi-
ties, and other financial services, and adopts the national treatment and most-favored-nation
principles with respect to financial services generally.
42. National treatment, most-favored-nation, and minimum standard of treatment are adopted. It also
contains, inter alia, rules for transfers, performance requirements expropriation, and compensation.
43. Unlike GATS, NAFTA complementary chapters on cross-border trade in services and investment
do not take a positive list approach to coverage, but rather apply to all measures affecting trade
and investment and not specifically excluded from coverage. The exclusions (i.e. exceptions to
investment and cross-border services disciplines) are listed in a set of annexes in the form of neg-
ative lists. See id. annexes I-VII.
44. In particular regarding performance requirements. See id. art. 1106.
45. Although NAFTA government procurement provisions are similar to the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Government, this Agreement is one of the GATT plurilateral agreements and its adhe-
sion is not mandatory. The NAFTA is based on a threshold approach. Procurement national treat-
ment obligations are adopted with respect to purchases by government departments or agencies over
US $50,000 of goods and services and over US $6.5 million for construction services. With respect to
federal government enterprises, these thresholds are raised to US $250,000 and US $8 million respec-
tively. It also includes provision for transparency and bid-challenge procedures. See id. art. 1001.
46. Chapter IX applies to all standards-related measures (SRM), including services in land trans-
portation and telecommunications, with the exception of agriculture and procurement standards
which are dealt with in their own chapters (VII and X respectively). NAFTA provisions essentially
require the use of international standards as the basis for domestic SRM. See id. art. 905.1. Parties
shall to the greatest extent practicable, make compatible their respective SRM. See id. art. 906.2.
In addition, the Agreement requires mutual recognition when a Party demonstrates the equiva-
lence of its regulation and mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures when Parties
are satisfied as to their adequacy. See id. arts. 906.4 & 904.6.
47. NAFTA does not include substantive rules on antidumping/countervailing duty (adv/cv) matters.
Parties are obliged to comply with the GATT provisions, including the Antidumping and
Subsidies Codes. Chapter XIX, however, includes the binational panel review of final ad/cvd
determinations. This is a unique mechanism and one of the most controversial institutions of the
Agreement. For the reasons behind its creation and the problems of its implementation in
Mexico, see J. C. Thomas & Sergio L6pez-Ayll6n, Nafta Dispute Settlement and Mexico:
Interpreting Treaties and Reconciling Common and Civil Law Systems in a Free Trade Area, in 32
THE CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 75-122 (1995).
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On the basis of these characteristics of NAFTA, this article now analyzes the role it has
played in the integration of Latin America.
B. THE CURRENT SITUATION OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.
Efforts to achieve integration in the American continent have had a long and complex
history.48 By the 1960s, most countries in the region had adopted an import substitution
model that implied a restrictive trade policy. Given that internal markets were small, how-
ever, it was believed that regional markets offered advantages. For this reason, the
Montevideo Treaty was established in 1960. This Treaty created the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA) whose aim was to liberalize regional trade over a period of
twelve years. Other regional treaties (such as the Central American Common Market 49 or
the Andean Group 50 ) were signed at about the same time. None of these fully complied
with its original schedules or objectives.
By the late 1960s, the import substitution model was no longer effective. This, togeth-
er with the processes of change in the international and regional economy, and the specific
political conditions of each country, forced the countries in the region to modify their
development strategies, particularly with regard to trade and investment policies. In 1980,
LAFTA was replaced, through the Montevideo Treaty, by the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA). The aim of this organization is to increase "bilateral trade among the
member countries and between member countries and third countries through bilateral
and multilateral agreements, with the goal of eventually achieving regional free trade."
LAIA has eleven members that include the major Latin American countries. A significant
number of trade agreements have been signed under LAIA's coverage.
All the countries in the continent are currently members of the WTO, and are signato-
ries to one or several regional integration agreements, the majority of which have been
negotiated within the framework of LAIA. 51 In ECLAs view, these agreements have had
significant consequences for the countries in the region, since international agreements
constitute the framework within which national trade policies must be developed.
48. For an overview, see ALFREDO GUERRA-BORGES, LA INTEGRACION DE AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE
(Mexico, U.N.A.M. 1991).
49. Established through an instrument signed on December 13, 1961 and effective as of June 3, 1961.
General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, 455 U.N.T.S. 3 (1963).
50. Established through the Cartagena Agreement signed on May 26, 1969. Agreement on Andean
Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969,8 I.L.M. 910 (1969).
51. NAFTA was obviously not negotiated within the framework of LAIA, since neither Canada nor
the United States belongs to this organization. Moreover, negotiation of the NAFTA agreement
created a problem for Mexico regarding the application of Article 44 of the Montevideo Treaty,
which established the obligation of granting the remaining members of this organization most-
favored-nation (MFN) status. This obligation, which also affected other extra-regional integra-
tion agreements (such as the MERCOSUR-European Union agreements), was resolved through
the Interpretative Protocol of Article 44 of the Montevideo Treaty of 1980, allowing members
that have granted preferences to third countries the right not to have to apply the MFN clause
and to extend these preferences to other LAIA members provided negotiations are launched to
compensate LAIA members. Mexico invoked this Protocol with regard to its obligations to LAIA
members in respect of its membership in NAFTA.
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Countries should adapt their policies to the new international provisions, and
the demands imposed by others in order to mitigate the direct or indirect
effects that measures adopted at the national level may have on trade and
investment flows. It should be noted that this does not simply involve a
change of instruments . . . adapting internal legislation entails significant
institutional changes and demands the improvement of the State's institutions
to enable it to play its regulatory role efficiently.
52
The current status of integration in the region is a highly complex web of agreements
whose convergence is uncertain and whose consistency experiences significant problems,
which are not always acknowledged. 53 The following table (Table 1) provides a summary
of the most important processes of regional integration in the American continent.
52. CEPAL, supra note 27, at 53.
53. For an overview, see Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Integraci6n (ALADI), La situaci6n delproce-




PRINCIPAL MULTILATERAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS IN THE AMERICAN CONTINENT 54
Agreement Countries Type Observations
Latin American Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Sectoral Replaced LAFTA. Signed
Integration Association Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Agreements August 12, 1980. By 1996,
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, (Regional Scope approximately 82 regional
Uruguay and Venezuela and Partial Scope agreements had been signed
Agreements) within the framework of
LAIA. Nine of these belong to




Southern Common Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay Customs union Signed March 26, 1991,
Market (Mercosur) and Uruguay effective as of January 1,
1994. Currently constitutes an
imperfect customs union.
Affiliated to LAIA.
Andean Group Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Customs union Signed May 6, 1969 and
Ecuador and Venezuela modified through the May 25,
1988 Quito Protocol. The
1991 Barahona Act
established an Andean Free
Trade Area, effective as of
January 1, 1992, with
common external tariffs.
Central American Salvador, Guatemala, Customs union Signed December 13, 1960,
Common Market Honduras, Nicaragua and Members have effective as of June 3, 1961.
Costa Rica. declared their aim Common tariffnot uniformly
of creating a applied.
common market,
but have failed to
reach agreement
on schedules.
Caribbean Common The original members were Customs union Signed July 4, 1973, effective
Market (Caricom) Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, as of August 1, 1973.
Trinidad, and Tobago.
North American Free Canada, United States, and Free trade area Signed December 17, 1992,
Trade Agreement Mexico. effective as of January 1,
(NAFTA) 1994.The free trade area will
be established for most goods
in 2004.
Group of Three (G3) Mexico, Venezuela and Free Trade Area Signed June 13, 1994,
Colombia effective as of January 1,
I 1_ 1 1995. Affiliated to LAIA.
Source: Organization of American States Foreign Trade Information System
54. For a detailed analysis of these agreements, see Organization of American States, Trade and
Integration Arrangements in the Americas: An Analytical Compendium, Cartagena Colombia, Mar.
21, 1996.
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In addition to the numerous multilateral regional integration agreements, there have
been fifteen bilateral integration agreements or agreements between an integration group
and a country (see Annex 1 that contains the signed agreements), not to mention the
instruments that are currently being negotiated. Finally, to provide a complete overview,
one should also include the thirty-five bilateral investment agreements, 55 which will be
crucial to the development of regional integration in the coming years (a list of these
instruments is given in Annex 2).
The question is, what role has NAFTA played in this process? This issue should be
examined from two points of view, the first being direct accession, the second being its
indirect influence.
First, regarding accession, NAFTA Article 2204 establishes the possibility that any
country may join the agreement.56 This situation was taken into account by those who
drafted the agreement, who, particularly in light of the experience of CUSFTA, attempted
to reduce the need to renegotiate the entire text of the agreement by means of a design that
would minimize changes in the event of future accessions.
This design explains the structure of the agreement in chapters and annexes. Each
chapter would contain the core of the obligations, leaving exceptions or specific provisions
for each country in the annexes. Thus, in the case of the accession of a fourth country, the
latter would theoretically only have to indicate its commitments or applicable exceptions
in specific annexes. The text of the chapters, in theory, will not be modified in case of
accession. This scheme is not perfect since, although it works in most cases, several provi-
sions exist that would have to be modified in the event of the accession of one or more
other countries. 57
55. Thirty-two of these agreements were signed after 1990. One should also include the trade agree-
ments which include disciplines and rules applicable to investment. For an overview, see
Organization of American States, Investment Agreements in the Western Hemisphere: A
Compendium (visited Apr. 8, 1999) <http://www.sice.oas.org/bitse.stm> (also available on com-
pact disc from the Foreign Trade Information System of the OAS).
56. NAFTA Article 2204 reads as follows:
1. Any country or group of countries may accede to this Agreement subject to
such terms and conditions as may be agreed between such country or coun-
tries and the Commission and following approval in accordance with the
applicable legal procedures of each country.
2. This Agreement shall not apply as between any Party and any acceding coun-
try or group of countries if, at the time of the accession, either does not con-
sent to such application.
NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 2204.
57. An example of the above can be found, for instance, in Chapter XX which contains the general
procedure for dispute settlement. This mechanism is primarily designed to operate on the basis
of two or three contending countries. Although it might admit a fourth and perhaps even a fifth
country, it would be unlikely to accommodate more than five members. This situation would
entail the need to redesign the operation of Chapter XX. Rules of origin are another, even more
complex, example. These were designed to operate in a trilateral and regional context. The addi-
tion of a fourth country would probably require their revision, at least in certain sectors such as
the automotive or textile sectors. Id. ch. 20.
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Beyond purely legal aspects, accession to NAFTA has proved difficult from a political
point of view, since the U.S. Congress' refusal to grant the President fast-track authority
effectively prevented Chile's accession. Nevertheless, this has not prevented the NAFTA
scheme from being extended to other countries in the region.
Indeed, following the passage of NAFTA, Mexico launched a vast trade negotiations
offensive in Latin America. 58 Five trade agreements have been signed to date, with six
more currently being negotiated. The following table (Table 2) summarizes the status of
Mexico's trade negotiations in the region.
TABLE 2.
MEXICO'S TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE AMERICAN CONTINENT
Agreement Status Under Under NAFTA
OMC LAIA Model
North American Free Trade Agreement Signed 12/17/92 Y
In force asof 111194
Treaty of Montevideo (LAIA) Signed 8/12/80 Y
In force as of 3/18/81
Free Trade Agreement with G3 (Venezuela Signed 6/13/94 Y Y y
and Colombia) In force as of 1/1/95
Free Trade Agreement with Bolivia Signed 9/10/94 Y Y Y
In force as of 1/1/95
Free Trade Agreement with Costa Rica Signed 415194 Y N Y
In force as of 1/1/95
Free Trade Agreement with Nicaragua Signed 12/18/97 Y N Y
In force as of 711198
Free Trade Agreement with Chile Signed 4/17/98 Y Y Y
In force 30 days after
completion of
formalities
Guatemala/Honduras/Salvador Negotiations Y N P
Belize Negotiations Y N P
Panama Negotiations Y N P
Trinidad and Tobago Negotiations Y N P
Ecuador Negotiations Y Y P
Peru Negotiations Y Y P
MERCOSUR Negotiations ? IY I U
FTAA Negotiations X I_?_ I U
Y=Yes N=No P= Possible U= Unlikely
58. See Herminio Blanco Mendoza, Las negociaciones comerciales de Mxico con el mundo (col. Una
visi6n de la modernizaci6n de M~xico, Mxico, Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica 1994).
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As the table shows, three of the free trade agreements have been negotiated under the
coverage of LAIA and are simultaneously agreements of partial scope and free trade agree-
ments. For LAIA, these agreements constitute third generation agreements.59
All the agreements negotiated by Mexico to date have, with few variations, closely fol-
lowed the NAFTA model. Indeed, in addition to virtually total coverage as regards goods,
they all contain rules on services, investments, technical standards, state purchases, intel-
lectual property, and dispute settlement. The principal differences lie in the exclusion of
some sectors, certain less strict disciplines, and the non-extension of Chapter XIX to these
agreements. Annex 3 of this paper provides a comparative chart of these agreements.
Although some differences exist, they are not enough to alter the original NAFTA model
significantly. In other words, Mexico has successfully used the NAFTA as a model in its
trade negotiations, and, with the exception of MERCOSUR, 60 will undoubtedly continue
using it in the rest of its agreements currently under negotiation.
In this process, it is also important to point out the fact that Chile had also signed a
significant number of trade agreements under the scope of LAIA. However, Chile has
recently signed a free trade agreement with Canada that essentially takes up the NAFTA
model. Moreover, it recently signed a new free trade agreement with Mexico, replacing the
one signed in 1992,61 whose structure and coverage follow the NAFTA model. Chile has
already signed agreements equivalent to NAFTA with Mexico and Canada. It will be inter-
esting to see the impact that they have on the future of Chile's negotiations.
Thus, NAFTA has played a significant role in regional integration. In the opinion of a
well-informed OAS expert:
The NAFTA has also had a major influence in the practice of trade policy
within the region, especially at the technical level where we can see the
NAFTA approach being duplicated at the sub-regional level. What are called
"newer" Latin American integration efforts have generally adopted more of a
"NAFTA-like" approach than the approach offered by the older Association
for Latin America Development and Integration (LAIA). 62
Even though it is impossible to predict the course of events, if the negotiations cur-
rently underway are completed within a reasonable schedule, then by the beginning of the
next century, the American continent would have a sort of vast free trade area, following
the NAFTA model, with Mexico as the hub, Canada, the United States, Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, and Chile, and foreseeably, Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Peru, and Ecuador. Added to this would be the
effects of liberalization resulting from agreements signed with these countries under dif-
59. Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Integraci6n (ALADI), Situaci6n y perspectivas de la liberalizaci6n
comercial en el marco de la ALADI, ALADI Doc. ALADI/SEC/Estudio 99, at 8 (1997), available at
<http://www.aladi.orglestudios/pdf/99.pdf>.
60. In this case, during its current phase, a broad coverage agreement is expected to be signed, which
will stop short of the establishment of a free trade area. See id. at 15.
61. This was in fact only a partial scope agreement restricted to trade in goods.
62. Donald R. Mackay, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Its Possible Extension to South
American Countries, in REGIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND.
CONVERGENCES, DIVERGENCES AND INTERACTION, supra note 6, at 236.
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ferent models. The structure of this scheme proves that the degree of liberalization pur-
sued in NAFTA is a viable model, consistent with multilateral rules, yet more advanced,
and one that permits effective, efficient continental integration. This outlook must be ana-
lyzed in light of the Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations.
C. NAFTA IN LIGHT OF THE FTAA.
In December 1994, at the behest of the United States, the heads of State of thirty-four
countries in the continent agreed in Miami to engage in negotiations to establish a Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in 2005.63 This aim was recently confirmed in the
Santiago Declaration of the Second Summit of the Americas64 where Heads of State and
Governments reaffirmed their "determination to conclude the negotiation of the FTAA no
later than 2005, and to make concrete progress by the end of the century." According to the
same Declaration, the FTAA agreement will be "balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent
and constitute a single undertaking."
In the San Josd Declaration 65 (that served as the basis for the launching of the FTAA
negotiations), the trade ministers agreed that the negotiations will encompass all of the
areas which fall within the WTO scope, although they also agreed that the negotiations will
also cover areas not presently covered under the WTO such as investments, government
procurement, and competition policy. It is important, however, to note that both invest-
ment and procurements are already covered under NAFTA. The agreement also contains
some provisions on competition policy, but these will require further development.
The negotiation will be carried forward under a structure lasting until 2004. The
Trade Negotiations Committee, composed of the Vice Ministers of Trade, will be responsi-
ble for its oversight. The Ministers also established the following nine negotiation groups:
market access, investment, services, government procurements, dispute settlement, agricul-
ture, intellectual property, subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties, and competi-
tion policy. A Consultative Group on Smaller Economies was also created.
What will NAFTAs role be during the process? In other words, will NAFTA be able to
serve as an agreement around which the negotiation process can be structured at the con-
tinental level? The answer to this question is, in principle, no. This does not, however,
mean that NAFTA will not have an impact on the future of negotiations.
Some analysts have tried to suggest that the NAFTA model contrasts with the MER-
COSUR approach. I believe that there is no conflict between them, since the two models
are not comparable. Indeed, the aim of MERCOSUR is to establish a customs union,
which is why this agreement implies the establishment of mechanisms and institutions
appropriate to this form of integration. The NAFTA is restricted to the creation of a free
trade area. What we have are two agreements with different objectives and structures.
63. For more information on the development of the negotiation process, see the FTAA official Web
site: <http://www.ftaa-alca.org>.
64. Declaration of Santiago, Apr. 19, 1998 (visited Apr. 8, 1999) <http://www.summit-
americas.org/chiledec.htm>.
65. San JosO Declaration, Mar. 1988, San Jos6, Costa Rica.
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In fact, the problem is framed on the basis of the minimum common denominators
that the continental agreement should contain. It is here that the trade interests of the
actors come into play to favor strategic positions for certain products and services, and
even for the application of fairly rigorous disciplines in markets with sharp differences
between them. A brief analysis shows that, under any hypothesis, the minimums of conti-
nental agreement could not be less than those contained in the WTO. A consensus exists
that the FTAA should be a continental agreement that should coexist with sub-regional
and bilateral agreements. 66
From this perspective, even if the NAFTA model is not implemented, the agreement
does, however, contain significant improvements that could be used in the continental
approach. Foremost among these is the relationship between investment and services,
which is undoubtedly a more liberal and efficient approach than that which exists in the
multilateral model. Other aspects in which the NAFTA can be used as a model is in the
issue of government procurements and technical standards.
As regards rules of origin, an enormously complex yet crucial aspect, NAFTA offers a
flexible scheme whose extension, with the appropriate modifications, could serve as the
basis for the determination and application of regional preferences, as long as there is no
consensus as regards multilateral negotiations.
Finally, one should consider the issues related to dispute settlement. It is generally
-accepted that the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism has proved effective. For this reason,
and to ensure compatibility between multilateral and regional rules, it would be worth con-
sidering that the multilateral forum would be an appropriate forum for settling disputes in
areas covered by WTO agreements. For those aspects not covered by the WTO, however, the
NAFTA model could serve as a model for the creation of a flexible yet effective dispute settle-
ment mechanism. Chapter XIX binational process review does not seem likely to be extend-
ed to a Continental Agreement. Instead substantive disciplines regarding antidumping/coun-
tervailing duty and competition policies may be developed in the FTAA.
In short, the complexity of the regional integration process, particularly in light of
negotiations concerning the FTAA and regional integration agreements, make it unlikely
that NAFTA will become the hub of the American system currently being created. This is
due as much to the peculiarities of NAFTA itself as to the technical difficulties involved in
a process of FTAA's scope.
Nevertheless, NAFTA will be an inevitable point of reference for at least the following
three reasons. First, because NAFTA is a significantly more sophisticated and complete
model than the majority of existing agreements in the region as regards both coverage and
disciplines. Second, because this model has already been accepted in negotiations within
the region and, with modifications, has become an element that integrates the system of
regional accords. Third, because the negotiators who form part of the North American
region will have the NAFTA model in mind as a parameter. These negotiators will obvious-
ly play a specific, crucial role in the process. Apropos of this, it will be extremely interesting
to see the results of the interaction between the European model and the NAFTA model in
the negotiations shortly to be initiated between the European Union and Mexico.
66. See ALADI, supra note 59.
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The processes of regional integration and the agreements that shape them entail
immense technical and political difficulties. Specific interests highlight the difficulties of
harmonizing regional and multilateral systems. An obvious risk exists that the multiplica-
tion of regional agreements may create a tangled spider's web, one of whose worst conse-
quences would be to create uncertainty in trade. It will be necessary to work using imagi-
nation and flexibility, seeking the most generous rules that are at the same time compatible
with the multilateral system. Moreover, particular care will have to be taken with institu-
tional aspects to create a simple, effective, and flexible framework, capable of responding
rapidly to trade needs. This is the challenge. NAFTA is not a perfect solution, but it does
provide certain useful elements. Evaluating its operation and reflecting on it may prove
advantageous in the difficult task awaiting us in the coming years.
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ANNEX 1.
BILATERAL AND INTRAREGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA





Bolivia-Mexico 9/10/94 X X
Canada-Chile 12/5/96 X
Colombia-Chile 12/6/93 X
Costa Rica-Mexico 4/5194 X
Chile-Ecuador 12120/94 X






Frame Agreement for the Establishment
of a Free Trade Zone between the






INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN THE AMERICAN CONTINENT
















El Salvador-Pera Granada-United States
Haiti-United States Honduras-United States
Jamaica-United States Nicaragua-United States
Panama-United States Paraguay-Peru
Trinidad and Tobao-United States
B. Investment rules Incorporated In trade
agreements
North America Free Trade Agreement Mexico-Bolivia Free Trade Agreement
G3 Free Trade Agreement Mexico-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement
Mexico-Nicaragua Free Trade Agreement Mexico-Chile Free Trade Agreement
South Common Market (Protocol of Colonia for the Andean Pact (Decision 291 of the Cartagena
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments Agreement Commission)
within Mercosur and Protocol of Buenos Aires for
the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investments
from non-parties of Mercosur
CARICOM (Principles and Directives on Foreign
Investments approved by the Conferences of Heads
of State of the CARICOM)
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